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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional defamation law protects the interest in one's reputation
and good name.I Modern defamation law attempts to balance First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press with the legitimate interest in
redressing wrongful injury. In Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 3 the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota recently tipped the scale against redressing
wrongful injury.
In Richie, the court considered whether Minnesota allows defamation
claims based on mental anguish and humiliation without proof of reputa-4
tional injury. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota
Court of Appeals - which had held that reputational harm could be pre-
sumed for purposes of summary judgment 5 - and reinstated the trial
1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
2. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
3. 544 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1996).
4. Id. at 27.
5. Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 532 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
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6court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The supreme court held that proof of reputational injury is a prerequisite
to recovery for defamation, because the purpose of defamation law is to7
compensate individuals for harm to their reputations. Furthermore, the
court chose to maintain its "historical caution regarding emotional dis-
tress claims."
8
This Case Note analyzes the effect the Richie decision will have on
plaintiffs seeking redress for emotional distress resulting from defamatory
statements. Part II explores the history and development of common law
defamation and its constitutional progeny. Part III outlines the facts in
Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp. as well as the court's holding and analysis.
Finally, Part IV details Minnesota's skepticism of emotional distress claims
through examination of the courts' interpretation of negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims and its rejection of invasion of
privacy claims. Part IV further illustrates that, although the Minnesota
Supreme Court correctly perceived the purpose of defamation law, its
strict adherence to "caution regarding emotional distress claims" 9 will
leave many plaintiffs without legal recourse for their injuries.
II. HISTORY
A. Defamation at Common Law
Defamation is an intentionally false written or spoken communica-
tion that injures another's reputation or good name. 0 A defamatory
communication "tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided."" Defamation law
aims to protect an individual's reputation and good name from invasion12
by such false statements. Defamation is composed of the torts of libel
6. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 30.
7. Id. at 28.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
11. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 773.
12. See id. § 111, at 771. Defamation law predates the Norman Conquest. See
Colin Rhys Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation By the Common Law, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 1051, 1054 (1962). The earliest punishments for defamation consisted of
public apology and sometimes physical punishment, such as cutting off the de-
famer's tongue. See id. at 1052-53. After the Norman Conquest, church courts had
jurisdiction over most defamation claims, and physical punishment was no longer
permitted. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 772. Instead, public penance
by the "sinner" became the sole remedy. See Lovell, supra, at 1054-55. Monetary
damages did not become available until the common-law courts received jurisdic-
tion in the sixteenth century. See id. at 1061; see also infra note 16 (describing how
jurisdiction came to be vested in the common-law courts).
[Vol. 23
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and slander." Libel is generally written defamation,'14 while slander is
generally spoken defamation. At common law, defamation was a mat-... 17
ter of strict liability. Liability was imposed, "regardless of fault, for un-
13. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 771. Libel was a common-law
crime in its origins and has remained so today. See id. § 112, at 785. Slander, by
itself, was never criminal. See id. Slander could become a common-law crime
.only when the words amounted to some other offense, such as sedition, blas-
phemy, or a breach of the peace." Id. Libel was treated more seriously and courts
imposed harsher penalties because the written, published word had greater poten-
tial for harm in an illiterate nation that revered the printed word. See id. The
chief importance of the distinction between the two torts is that some kinds of de-
famatory words might create liability without proof of actual damages if written,
but would require actual damages if spoken. See id. § 112, at 786.
14. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 771. Libel is that which is ob-
served through the sense of sight and sometimes through the senses of touch or
smell. See id. § 112, at 786. Examples of libel include pictures, photographs, signs,
statutes, or conduct with defamatory connotations. See id. According to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter (1)
by written or printed words, (2) its embodiment in physical form, or (3) any other
form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic
of written or printed words. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). Fac-
tors considered when determining whether the communication contains the
harmful qualities and characteristics of written words are: the area of dissemina-
tion; the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication; and the persis-
tence of the defamatory conduct. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 787.
15. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 771. Slander is perceived by the
sense of hearing and generally is not actionable without proof of actual damages.
See id. § 112, at 786-88. However, several categories of slander per se - which do
not require proof of actual harm to reputation or other damages - developed at
common law. See infra note 21 (defining four categories of slander per se). Some
posit that these exceptions developed because the defamatory meaning is appar-
ent on the face of such statements and is more likely to cause monetary damage.
See, e.g., KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 112, at 788.
16. Originally, common-law courts did not have jurisdiction over defamation
claims. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 772. Defamation claims were
handled by seigniorial courts governed by local lords. See id. However, jurisdiction
over defamation claims was transferred to the ecclesiastical courts when the sei-
gniorial courts deteriorated. See id. The ecclesiastical courts regarded defamation
as a sin and punished it with penance. See Lovell, supra note 12, at 1052-53. In the
sixteenth century, as the ecclesiastical courts lost their power, tort actions for slan-
der arrived in the common-law courts. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at
772. The Court of Star Chamber took jurisdiction over the crime of political libel
and later extended it to non-political libel. See id. After the Star Chamber was
abolished (due to its ineffectiveness and its oppressive tactics), the common-law
courts established jurisdiction over libel. See id.; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1406
(6th ed. 1990). The common-law courts retained the distinctions between libel
and slander. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 772. Libel was regarded as
both criminal and tortious, while slander remained a non-criminal tort. See id.
17. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 111, at 771. The element of publication
was the only element of defamation at common law that was not subject to strict
liability. See id. at 774-75.
1997]
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privileged publication of a false and defamatory statements which injured
the reputation of another."8  Furthermore, it was well established in
common law that reputational damage was presumed from the publica-
tion of libelous statements, without requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate
harm to his or her reputation.19 Slander, however, required the proof of20
special damages, or a specific showing of reputational harm, unless the
slander fell within the purview of one of the four categories of slander per
se.2 1 Thus, a common-law defamation claim requires proof of a defama-22 . 23 . . 24
tory statement that (1) is false; (2) refers to the plaintiff; and (3) is
published to a third party.25 In some cases, special damages must be
18. Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 480-81 (Minn.
1986) (citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416
(1954)).
19. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 112, at 795.
20. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing special damages).
21. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 112, at 793. Certain words, intrinsically
and without innuendo, are deemed to cause injury as a natural consequence. See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed. 1990). Such words constitute slander per
se. See id. There are generally four categories of slander per se: words imputing to
the plaintiff (1) a criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) an existing
loathsome or venereal disease; (3) business incompetency; and (4) serious sexual
misconduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 571-574 (1977). In cases in-
volving slander per se, plaintiffs need not prove special damages. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed. 1990).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). Not all insults are ac-
tionable; a statement must hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
SeeJAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 875 (4th ed. 1994). A pub-
lication may be defamatory on its face, or it may contain defamatory meaning only
if extrinsic circumstances are considered. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 11, at
782. The extrinsic facts necessary to make the statement defamatory are called the
"inducement." See HENDERSON ET AL., supra, at 881. The defamatory meaning
based on the extrinsic facts is called the "innuendo." See id. Furthermore, if the
statement is capable of both defamatory and non-defamatory meanings, the plain-
tiff must establish that the audience perceived its defamatory meaning. See id. at
880-81.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-559 (1977). At common law,
defamatory statements were presumed false. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 116, at 839. To overcome the presumption of falsity, the defendant had to prove
the truth of the statement. See id.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-559 (1977). The defamatory
statement must clearly refer to the plaintiff, and the recipient of the statement
must believe it refers to the plaintiff. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 112, at 784.
A statement concerning a group or class of persons typically does not give rise to a
defamation claim because of the difficulty in showing that it refers to a particular
individual within the group. See id. Thus, it is doubtful that a derogatory state-
ment referring to a group could be regarded as applicable to any one person
within the group enough to harm that person's reputation. See id. Relevant to the
analysis, however, is the size of the group, the nature and generality of the state-
ment, and the extravagance of the communication. See id.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). "The basis of the
[Vol. 23
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proven.2 6 Truth and privilege 27 are affirmative defenses. 28
B. Development of the Tort in Minnesota
A defamation claim, under Minnesota law, requires a similar show-
ing. In Minnesota, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) a false statement of
and concerning the plaintiff; (2) publication to someone other than the
plaintiff; and (3) that the statement tended to harm the plaintiff's reputa-
tion and to lower him or her in the estimation of the community.29 Once
the plaintiff proves these elements, the defendant bears the burden of
proving that the publication was true or privileged to avoid liability."
plaintiff's cause of action is the harm suffered from the reaction of others and not
hurt feelings." HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 875. The defamatory state-
ment must be published to someone other than the plaintiff. See id. The commu-
nication does not have to be spoken or written; gestures, actions, and other visual
representations may be defamatory. See id. at 877.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
27. A privilege may be either absolute or qualified. See HENDERSON ET AL., su-
pra note 22, at 893. If cloaked by absolute privilege, a party may publish defama-
tory statements for evil motives, knowing them to be false, without being liable.
See id. Absolutely privileged statements include those made with consent of the
plaintiff, communications between spouses, and statements made by government
officials while executing their governmental duties. See id. at 893-96. Whereas an
absolute privilege may never be lost, a qualified privilege may be lost if it is abused.
See id. Fair comment on matters of public concern - such as current political is-
sues and governmental officials - is an example of a statement that is qualifiedly
privileged. See id. at 897. However, such comments are not protected if they con-
tain false statements of fact. See id.
28. SeeKEETONETAL., supra note 1, § 116, at 839.
29. See, e.g., Rouse v. Dunkley & Bennett, P.A., 520 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn.
1994); Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954). In
Minnesota, a defendant must negligently or intentionally publish the statement to
a third party. SeeJadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491
(Minn. 1985). Compelled self-publication by the subject of the statement may also
fulfill the publication requirement. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986).
30. Minnesota recognizes two kinds of common-law privileges - absolute and
qualified. See Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Minn. 1982).
Absolute privileges protect defamatory statements even if they are made inten-
tionally or maliciously. See Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 416. For exam-
ple, statements made with the plaintiffs consent and statements made in the
course of government proceedings are absolutely privileged in Minnesota. See,
e.g., Utecht, 324 N.W.2d at 654 (holding that statements made with the plaintiff's
consent are privileged);Jensen v. Olson, 273 Minn. 390, 393, 141 N.W.2d 488, 490
(1966) (concluding that statements made in a civil service hearing are privileged);
Matthis, 243 Minn. at 224, 67 N.W.2d at 417 (finding statements made in probate
court proceedings to be privileged); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 89, 129
N.W. 147, 14748 (1910) (extending privilege to statements made in legislative
proceedings).
Qualified privileges rebut the presumption of common-law malice that arises
1997]
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Three types of damages may be recovered for defamation in Minne-
32sota: special damages, punitive damages, and general damages. Special
damages are recoverable upon proof of actual and special pecuniary loss,• 33 ..
supported by clear evidence. Libel plaintiffs need not prove special34
damages to recover. However, slander is actionable without proof of
35special damages only if it is slander per se. Upon a showing of common-
law malice, punitive damages are recoverable to punish the defendant.
36
Finally, general damages are presumed in cases of defamation per se, and
they are recoverable without proof of actual injury to reputation because
injury to reputation is presumed.
once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of defamation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593-598A (1977). However, the protection
afforded by a qualified privilege can be lost if the privilege is abused, such as when
the publication is knowingly false, includes unprivileged information, or includes
information exceeding the scope of the privilege. See id. Minnesota courts have
extended qualified privilege to: (1) fair and substantially accurate reporting of of-
ficial proceedings or public records, see, e.g., Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101
Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1908); (2) comments on the conduct of public
officials, see, e.g., Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Minn. 1990); (3)
statements made in the public interest, see, e.g., Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210,
211-12, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909); and (4) statements made by former employer
about the reason for employee discharge or discipline, if made upon a proper oc-
casion and for a proper purpose, see, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297
N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. 1980).
31. SeeJadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 480-81; Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the
Constitution: First Amendment Limitations on the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander,
3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 81, 83 (1977) [hereinafter Minnesota Defamation Law].
32. See Minnesota Defamation Law, supra note 31, at 85.
33. See, e.g., Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 492 (stating that "actual injury supported
by competent evidence" is required to recover special damages). An example of
special damages, also called actual damages, is compensation for lost employment
resulting from the defamation. See Minnesota Defamation Law, supra note 31, at 85.
34. See Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 7
(Minn. 1984).
35. See Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 259; see also supra note 21 (discussing four
common-law categories of slander per se). Minnesota recognizes several catego-
ries of slander per se. See, e.g., Baufield v. Safelite Glass Corp., 831 E Supp. 713,
717 (D. Minn. 1993) (imputing serious sexual misconduct to another is slander
per se); Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.
1987) (falsely accusing another of committing a crime is slander per se); Manion v.
Jewel Tea Co., 135 Minn. 250, 252-53, 160 N.W. 767, 768 (1916) (imputing busi-
ness incompetency to another is slander per se).
36. See Bradley v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 678 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991). Common-law malice is ill will or bad faith. See, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 98, 235 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1975). But seeJadwin, 367
N.W.2d at 483 (holding that after Gertz, private plaintiffs can no longer recover
punitive damages against a media defendant by showing common-law malice, but
instead must show actual malice).
37. See Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258-59. General damages - often referred to
as presumed damages - are nonpecuniary in nature and compensate for things
[Vol. 23
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C. Constitutional Dimensions
Before 1964, defamatory statements were not deemed to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.38 Until
that time, the United State Supreme Court had held that the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech and free press protected only truth
and not falsehood.39 Eventually, the Supreme Court began to recognize
that an absolute duty to publish truth inhibited First Amendment free-
doms.40 Therefore, beginning in 1964, a series of landmark decisions
brought defamatory falsehoods within the protection of the First
Amendment. These decisions greatly limited a plaintiff's ability to recover
in defamation actions and had a profound effect on state defamation law4'
by replacing the common law's strict liability with fault standards based on.... 42
the public or private status of the plaintiff. The Court first applied a
constitutional interpretation to the traditional, well-established rules of
common-law defamation in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.4 3
In New York Times, the plaintiff, an elected commissioner of public af-
fairs of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a defamation action against The
New York Times for allegedly libelous statements made about him in a po-
litical advertisement.4 He alleged that the advertisement falsely accused
the city police of mistreating civil rights protesters. 45 The Alabama Su-
such as reputational harm, emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment.
See id. However, after Gertz, actual malice must be proven to recover presumed
damages against a media defendant. SeeJacobson v. Rochester Communications
Corp., 410 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1987).
38. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) (stating that
libelous statements are not constitutionally protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (suggesting that prevention and punishment of
libelous statements had never been thought to cause a constitutional problem).
39. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). According to
the Court, there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, because they
do not advance society's interests in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues. Id. at 341 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964)). Falsehoods belong to a category of utterances which "are no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." Id. at 340 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572).
40. See M. Linda Dragas, Comment, Curing a Bad Reputation: Reforming Defama-
tion Law, 17 U. HAw. L. REV. 113, 127 (1995).
41. But see Minnesota Defamation Law, supra note 31, at 100 (suggesting that
the impact of New York Times was not profound in Minnesota because the Minne-
sota Supreme Court adopted a rule in 1925 requiring a public official-plaintiff to
prove the defendant acted with common-law malice).
42. See infra notes 48-55, 59-64 and accompanying text.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. Id. at 257-58.
45. Id. at 258. Although the advertisement did not specifically name the
1997]
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preme Court decided in the commissioner's favor,4 6 but the United States
47
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that to protect "open and ro-
bust debate,"48 the First and the Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution prohibit a public official from recovering damages for
defamatory statements made about his or her official conduct, unless heS49
or she can prove that the statement was published with actual malice.
The Court reasoned that public debate and the right to criticize govern-
ment and public officials are central to a democratic nation.50 Accord-
ingly, the Court deemed some measure of constitutional protection to be
necessary in defamation law to prevent citizens from censoring their criti-
cism of government.5 ' Thus, New York Times initiated constitutional pro-
tection of published defamatory statements.
Three years after its decision in New York Times, the Court extended
application of the actual malice standard to include public figures52 in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.53 Under Curtis, public figures, like public of-
ficials, must prove the publisher's knowledge of falsity or its reckless disre-
gard of the truth to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods.54 The
commissioner, he claimed that it referred to him because, as commissioner, he su-
pervised the police department. Id.
46. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (Ala. 1962). In Ala-
bama, the common-law privilege protects fair comment only if the criticism of the
public official is completely true. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 263. In the ad
that was the subject of New York Times, a few minor details were false, thus preclud-
ing the privilege of fair comment. Id. at 258-59. For example, the demonstrating
students sang the national anthem and not My Country Tis Of Thee, as was reported
in the advertisement. Id.
47. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
48. Id. at 270. The Court noted that it is realistic to expect that some error
will result from "open and robust" debate. Id. at 271-72. Therefore, some falsity
must be protected to encourage open debate. Id.
49. Id. at 283. Actual malice requires a showing, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false. See id. at 285-86.
50. Id. at 279.
51. Id.
52. People become public figures either by occupying a position "of such per-
suasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes,"
or by voluntarily placing "themselves to the forefront of particular public contro-
versies in order to influence the resolution." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345 (1974). To determine whether a person is a "limited public figure," one
must examine the nature and extent of the person's participation in the contro-
versy. See id.
53. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). In Curtis, The Saturday Evening Post claimed that
Coach Wally Butts of the University of Georgia had conspired with Coach "Bear"
Bryant of the University of Alabama to fix a football game between their schools.
Id. at 135. The Court held that Butts was a public figure and must prove actual
malice to recover. Id.
54. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 23
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Court reasoned that the New York Times actual malice standard applies to
public figures because, like public officials, they have access to the media
and play an influential role in shaping the events that concern society.55
Accordingly, the Curtis Court took constitutional protection of defamatory
statements one step further.
In 1971, the Supreme Court accepted another opportunity to ex-
pand First Amendment protection in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.5 6 The
Court held that the constitutional requirement of actual malice - as de-
veloped in New York Times and Curtis - applied whenever the defamatory
statements related to a matter of public concern, regardless of the plain-
tiffs status as a public or a private figure. Therefore, under Rosenbloom,
private individuals defamed in the discussion of public issues had no re-
course for re1putational injuries unless they could prove actual malice by
the publisher.
However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,59 the Supreme Court reconsid-
ered the question of constitutional protection in a defamation action
brought by private individuals, rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality opinion.60
The Court found that in cases involving private individuals, Rosenbloom's
application of the actual malice standard abridged legitimate state inter-
ests in enforcing defamation remedies and in protecting the reputations
of private individuals. Therefore, the Court held that as long as states do
61
not impose liability without fault, they may decide what standard of 1i-
55. Id.; see also supra note 52 (explaining how one becomes a public figure).
56. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (holding that a private individual arrested for selling
allegedly obscene literature must show actual malice on the part of the defendant
radio station, which reported the individual's arrest without stating the literature
was only "allegedly" obscene).
57. Id. at 52. Eightjustices filed five separate opinions in this plurality deci-
sion. Justice William Brennan's plurality opinion focused on society's interest in
learning about issues of public concern. See id. at 43. Justice Brennan reasoned
that the nature of the event, rather than the status of the plaintiff, should be the
focal point of the examination. Id.
58. See id. at 52.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, an attorney in a high-profile case brought a
libel action against the publisher of a magazine article that described him as a
"Leninist," "Communist-fronter," and a participant in "Marxist" activities. Id. at
326. The Court concluded Gertz was not a public figure. See id. at 352.
60. See id. The Court reasoned that private individuals are more vulnerable to
injury than public officials or public figures because of their lack of opportunity
for rebuttal. Thus, the state's interest in protecting private individuals is corre-
spondingly greater. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 345-46.
62. In the Court's view, the imposition of strict liability could lead to intoler-
able self-censorship by the media. Id. at 34041. The Court's prohibition against
strict liability has eliminated the common law's presumption of damages in defa-
mation actions, at least when the suit is brought against a media defendant or
against someone who utilizes the public media. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 112, at 796.
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63
ability should apply to those who defame private individuals. However,
the Court emphasized that private individuals who do not prove actual
malice may recover compensation only for actual injury, and they may not
recover punitive or presumed damages.6 4 The Court did not define actual
injury, but specifically stated that it is not limited to out-of-pocket costs.
State courts are free to include the typical types of actual harm resulting
from defamatory falsehoods, including "impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering."' 7 Thus, in Gertz, the Court retreated from its expansion of
First Amendment protection of defamatory falsehoods and shifted its fo-
cus back toward the compensation of those whose reputations had been
injured by such statements.
The Supreme Court continued this retreat two years later in Time,• 68
Inc. v. Firestone. In Firestone, the Court made clear that Gertz does not re-69
quire proof of injury to reputation in a defamation case. The Court held
that allowing recovery for other injuries (such as emotional distress),
without proof of injury to reputation, does not violate Gertz's constitu-
tional requirement limiting recovery to proven actual injury when actual70
malice is not present. Gertz requires only evidence of actual injury and
no presumed damages where a private individual's claim is based on neg-
ligence rather than on actual malice.7 ' Therefore, the question of
whether injury to reputation is a prerequisite to recovery for defamation is
63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. The Court stated, "The States should retain sub-
stantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory false-
hoods injurious to the reputation of a private individual." Id. at 345-46. Minne-
sota has adopted a negligence standard. SeeJadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985). In Minnesota, a private individual may
recover actual damages for defamatory publication by showing that "the defendant
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the defamatory
statement was false." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. g
(1976)). Defamation defendants will be judged on whether their conduct was that
of a reasonable person under similar circumstances. See id.
64. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (holding that a private plaintiff suing over state-
ments involving private matters need not show actual malice to recover presumed
or punitive damages).
65. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The Court noted that trial courts have consid-
erable experience in giving appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). In Time, the defendant argued that Gertz precluded
recovery because the plaintiff withdrew her claim for damages to reputation be-
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open for each state's determination. 72 Until Richie v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., the Supreme Court of Minnesota had never been faced with the is-
sue and, thus, the question had remained unanswered in Minnesota.73
III. RicHIE V. PARAMOuNT PICTURES CORPORATION
A. The Facts
In September 1992, Denise Richie successfully litigated a civil suit
against her parents, Dennis and Lynnell Richie, arising out of sexual
abuse by Dennis Richie.7 4 The jury rendered a verdict against Dennis for
sexual abuse, and against Lynnell for negligently failing to prevent the
abuse. 75 After the verdict, a producer for The Maury Povich Show76 con-
tacted Kathy Tatone, Denise Richie's attorney in the civil action, regarding
an appearance on the show7 by Denise and Tatone.77 Tatone negotiated
the terms of the appearance.
Before the scheduled taping, the show's producers requested photo-79
graphs of Denise Richie and her parents. Denise approved the use of a
photograph and suggested that Tatone look through a family photo al-
80bum for a picture of Denise in her graduation gown with her parents.
Tatone provided the show with a picture of Denise in her graduation
gown standing between two adults. However, the adults in the photo-
graph were not Denise's parents; rather, they were her godparents, Karen
Gerten andJames Richie.8
2
During the broadcast on November 5, 1992, the show's producers
displayed the photograph of Denise with Gerten and Richie while the acts
of sexual abuse committed by Denise's father were described.8 3 Neither
Gerten nor Richie was referred to by name; Denise's parents' names were
72. See generally Earl L. Kellett, Annotation, Proof of Injury to Reputation as Pre-
requisite to Recovery of Damages in Defamation Action - Post-Gertz Cases, 36 A.L.R.4TH
807 (1985) (analyzing how, after Gertz, jurisdictions have split into "two camps" on
the question of whether injury to reputation must be shown).
73. See Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 1996);
see also Kellett, supra note 72, at 811-13 (listing jurisdictions that impose a prereq-
uisite of harm to reputation).
74. See Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 23.
75. Id.
76. The Maury Povich Show is a daytime television talk show on which guests
appear to discuss their experiences regarding the topic or subject of the show.
77. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 23.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 23-24.
80. Id. at 24.
81. Id.
82. Id. Gerten and Richie are Denise Richie's maternal aunt and paternal
uncle. Id. at 24 n.2.
83. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 24.
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used throughout the show.8 4 A few weeks after the broadcast, the show
aired a retraction at the request of Richie and Gerten. 5
Neither Karen Gerten nor James Richie saw the original broadcast
86airing their picture. However, they eventually watched a videotape of the
show after learning of it from friends and family."7 Both Gerten and
Richie testified they will never know whether people saw the broadcast or
think less of them because of it.8s  Furthermore, neither Gerten nor
Richie lost income or incurred special damages as a result of the broad-89
cast. However, Gerten and Richie claimed they had suffered demonstra-
ble harm to their reputations.90 They stated that friends and family ques-
tioned them about their involvement in the abuse, and Richie claimed he
received the "cold shoulder" and raw hamburgers from a formerly friendly
Hardee's employee. 9' According to Gerten, two people who knew the
photographs were a mistake contacted her about the show.
9
2
Richie and Gerten asserted that they suffered emotional distress after93
viewing the videotape. Richie stated that he was "shocked," "humiliat-
ed," "blown away," "just crushed," and "very sick" about the broadcast.
9 4
Richie stated that he did not "take this lightly" because his sister had been
abused by their father during Richie's childhood.95  Similarly, Gerten
stated that the broadcast was "upsetting and embarrassing" and made her
"sick to [her] stomach," "emotionally upset," and "a basket case."
96
In May 1993, Gerten and Richie commenced this action against
Paramount Pictures Corporation, Kathy Tatone, and MoPo Productions,
Inc.,97 alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both
84. Id.
85. Id. Interestingly, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court noted
that a "rebuttal seldom suffices to undo [the] harm caused by defamatory false-
hoods" because "the truth rarely catches up with a lie." 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9
(1974).




90. Id. at 26.
91. Id.
92. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 26.




97. Id. at 23. MoPo Productions Inc. provided the services of the host, Maury
Povich, but Povich was not aware that a photograph was being used during the in-
terview. Id. Although it was later dismissed from the suit, Hubbard Broadcasting,
which broadcast the show within Minnesota, also was named as a defendant. Id. at
23 n.1.
98. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 23.
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claims." The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's de-
cision and remanded the case for trial.' ° Richie and Gerten appealed to
the supreme court.101
B. The Court's Holding and Analysis
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court
of appeals, reinstating summary judgment in favor of the defendants."'
Following Gertz's mandate, the supreme court stated that recovery cannot
be based on presumed damages when the defamatory statements are.. 103
made by the media, without proof of actual malice, and about a matter104
of public concern. Plaintiffs must demonstrate actual damages to re-105
cover. Furthermore, the supreme court held that the trial court did not
err in finding that neither Richie nor Gerten demonstrated sufficient ac-S. 106
tual damage to their reputations to support a defamation claim.
Writing for the majority, Justice Esther M. Tomjanovich explained
that despite the lack of a constitutional bar to recovery for defamation
claims based solely on emotional damages, Minnesota does not allow re-
covery for damages based solely on emotional injury such as mental an-.... 107
guish or humiliation. Absent actual malice, Minnesota plaintiffs must
99. Id. The district court found that Richie and Gerten failed to show suffi-
cient reputational harm to sustain a defamation claim. Id. at 24. According to the
court, harm to reputation could not be presumed, and the emotional harm shown
by Gerten and Richie could not support a defamation claim. Id. The district court
also held that Tatone's communications were privileged either by the qualified
immunity protecting attorneys or by a qualified privilege for statements made on
proper occasion for proper motive. Id. at 25.
100. See Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 532 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995). The majority, in a split decision, found that harm to reputation could
be presumed for summary judgment purposes, based on the seriousness of the
false statements made on national television. Id. at 240 ("[C]ommon sense tells us
that of the hundreds of thousands of possible viewers not all, as a matter of law,
thought absolutely nothing ill of appellants, if only to a small degree."). The court
also found that no privilege shielded Tatone. Id. at 243; see also supra note 99 (de-
scribing the privileges that arguably applied to Tatone). The court did not con-
sider the invasion of privacy issue on appeal because Richie and Gerten did not
address the issue in their brief to the court. Id. at 237 n.1.
101. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 23.
102. Id. at 30.
103. Kathy Tatone was considered a media defendant because her communica-
tion utilized the television medium. Id. at 26 n.5. Gertz's prohibition against pre-
sumed damages absent actual malice applies in suits against "the press or broad-
cast media and those who utilize these means." KEETON ET AL., Supra note 1, § 112, at
796 (emphasis added).
104. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 26.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id. at 27-28. However, once defamation is established, "general" damages
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demonstrate actual damage to their reputations to recover against media
defendants.'l 8 The court found that none of the cases relied upon by
Richie and Gerten allowed emotional harm, unaccompanied by harm to
reputation, to sustain a defamation claim. "9 Rather, the court consistently
has acknowledged that the primary purpose of a defamation action is to
"1compensat[e] private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, " 1 "
and it has "exercised historical caution regarding emotional distress
claims" due to their highly subjective nature the the ease with which false
claims can be made."'
In contrast to defamation's focus on injury to reputation, the court
noted that the torts of invasion of privacy compensate for mental distress
resulting from public exposure. 12 Minnesota, however, has never recog-
nized a cause of action for invasion of privacy."1 3 To allow recovery for a
defamation claim based exclusively on emotional harm, the court rea-
soned, would be the equivalent of allowing recovery for invasion of privacy
and would be inconsistent with the court's previous rejection of such
claims.
114
may be recovered for injury to reputation, wounded feelings, humiliation, and
physical pain. Id. at 27 (citing KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 112, at 794-95). Once
defamation is proven, emotional distress damages are recoverable as "parasitic"
damages. Id.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id. at 27-28.
110. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 28 (citingJadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
367 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Minn. 1985)).
111. Id. (citing K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995)).
112. Id. at 28; see also infra text accompanying note 141 (discussing the four
distinct types of invasion of privacy).
113. See Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 28. Minnesota courts strictly adhere to a general
rule of nonrecognition. See, e.g., Hendry v. Connor, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226
N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975) ("Minnesota has never recognized, either by legislative or
court action, a cause of action for invasion of privacy, even though many other
states have done so."); Stubbs v. North Mem'l Med. Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a "long established rule in Minnesota is that invasion
of privacy is not a recognized cause of action"); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411
N.W.2d 902, 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("Minnesota has not recognized a cause of
action for invasion of privacy."); House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d
684, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("Clearly there is no action for invasion of privacy
in Minnesota."). However, when discussing the tort, the Minnesota courts have
referred to Prosser's four-tort classification scheme. See, e.g., Stubbs, 448 N.W.2d at
80; see also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
114. Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 28.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RICHIE DECISION
In Richie, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly interpreted defa-
mation law by holding that injury to reputation is a prerequisite to recov-115
ering damages. However, in light of the court's historical skepticism to-
ward emotional distress claims, many plaintiffs now will be unable to
obtain legal redress for injurious false statements. The court's caution has
left other tort theories - such as intentional infliction of emotional dis-116 . 117
tress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of pri-118
vacy - unlikely alternatives for relief. Thus, unless Minnesota recognizes
invasion of privacy or relaxes its standards with regard to emotional dis-
tress claims, the Richie court's holding will create a void whereby many
plaintiffs will be left without compensation for their emotional injuries.
This analysis of the Richie decision begins with a discussion of the
underlying purposes of defamation law. A detailed analysis of the likeli-
hood of recovery under alternative tort theories will follow to illustrate
Minnesota's historical caution toward emotional distress claims.
As noted previously, the Richie court correctly perceived the purpose
of defamation law in holding that proof of reputational injury is a prereq-119
uisite to recovery. Damage to reputation is the "essence and gravamen"
115. See id.
116. Intentional infliction of emotional distress was first recognized as a cause
of action in Minnesota in 1983. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d
428, 438 (Minn. 1983) ("[T]he problems inherent in allowing recoveries for men-
tal and emotional disturbances can be more clearly and adequately addressed if
intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized as a separate and inde-
pendent tort."). The Hubbard court adopted the tort as it is set forth in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts "[0]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct inten-
tionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liabil-
ity for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm." Id. at 438-39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965)). However, the court has specifically labeled intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as a disfavored tort. See Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (stating that its
interpretation of this tort would be limited in scope and would not significantly
expand the scope of conduct that is actionable); see also Eklund v. Vincent Brass &
Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 378-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that
Minnesota disfavors claims seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress) ("The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it."). Furthermore, the Hubbard
court limited application of the tort to only those cases involving particularly egre-
gious facts. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (indicating that particularly egregious
facts are required in order to prevent fictitious claims).
117. See Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982) (rec-
ognizing negligent infliction of emotional distress).
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. See Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996).
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of a defamation action. 2 0 "Defamation is not concerned with the plain-
tiff's own humiliation, wrath or sorrow, except as an element of 'parasitic'• ,,121
damages attached to an independent cause of action. Consequently,
plaintiffs in a defamation action should be required to prove actual harm
to reputation before recovering for emotional distress. Alternative emo-
tional distress theories, however, would not require similar proof of repu-
tational harm.
Plaintiffs whose reputations have been harmed may attempt to re-
cover under the related causes of causes of action for negligent or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy, in addition to
their defamation claims.12 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court's re-
strictive attitude a1 3 regarding these torts likely will prevent plaintiffs with
failed defamation claims from recovering for their emotional distress un-
der these alternative theories.
First, plaintiffs with a failed defamation claim cannot recover by as-
serting a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Minnesota
case law establishes that failure of the defamation claim precludes recov-. 124
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. A separate claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress requires a showing by plaintiffs• "121
that they were in the "zone of danger" of physical impact, feared for
120. Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 532 N.W.2d 235, 244 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (Davies, J., dissenting) (citing Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co., 649 P.2d 1239,
1243 (Kan. 1982)).
121. KEETONETAL., supranote 1, § 111, at 771.
122. See Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in Minne-
sota, 19 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 1, 84 (1993).
123. The supreme court has adopted a cautious stance because "[e]motional
distress is highly subjective, often transient, and easily alleged." Richie, 544 N.W.2d
at 28 (citing Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 n.3 (Minn.
1993)). Given its highly subjective nature, it may lead to fictitious claims. See
Steenson, supra note 122, at 96.
124. See, e.g., O'Brien v. A.B.P. Midwest, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 766, 774 n.10 (D.
Minn. 1992) (explaining that emotional distress damages may be recovered if a
plaintiff prevails on a defamation claim); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village
of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 367, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963) (stating the well-established
rule that mental distress damages cannot be sustained when there is no accompa-
nying physical injury, unless there has been other misconduct constituting a direct
invasion of a plaintiff's rights); Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d
138, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that where a defamation claim is unsuc-
cessful, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must also fail); Lee v.
Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stat-
ing where appellant's defamation claim cannot withstand summary judgment, the
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim also fails); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg.
Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim based on the same facts as a failed defamation claim
cannot survive); see also Steenson, supra note 122, at 84.
125. Minnesota first applied the "zone of danger" rule to negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims in Purcell v. Saint Paul City Railway Co. 48 Minn. 134,
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their safety,126 and suffered contemporaneous physical injuries or manifes-
tations. Because the essence of a defamation claim is damage to reputa-
tion, defamatory statements are unlikely to place plaintiffs in a "zone of
danger" of physical impact or to cause them to fear for their safety. Plain-
tiffs who can establish a separate tortious act or direct invasion of their
rights - such as defamation, malicious prosecution, or other willful or ma-
licious conduct - can avoid the "zone of danger" requirements and still.• 128
recover under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Under this exception, however, the success of the claim for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress depends upon the success of the defamation• 1 2 9
claim. Hence, recovery is impossible if the defamation claim fails and
the plaintiff is unable to prove successfully the elements of any other
tort.
Second, plaintiffs often assert an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim along with a defamation claim. Intentional infliction of
emotional distress is characterized by conduct which is extreme and out-
rageous, is committed intentionally or recklessly, and causes severe emo-
tional distress. 13 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court defines "extreme and
outrageous conduct" as conduct "so atrocious that it passes the bounda-
ries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.'
3 2
138, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892) (stating that if the emotional distress was the natu-
ral consequence or caused by "the circumstances of peril and alarm in which the de-
fendant placed the plaintiff, and the emotional distress caused nervous shock and
consequent illness, then the negligence was the proximate cause of those injuries"
(emphasis added)).
126. To recover for emotional distress, plaintiffs in Minnesota must be in the
zone of danger and fear for their own safety. See Steenson, supra note 122, at 11.
Minnesota has not adopted the "bystander recovery" rule and, thus, will not allow
recovery based on the plaintiff's fear for another person's safety. See id.
127. See, e.g., Leaon v. Washington County, 379 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986)
(holding claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be premised on
physical manifestations of distress); Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d
26, 31 (Minn. 1982) (holding there can be no recovery absent some accompany-
ing physical injury); Covey, 490 N.W.2d at 144 (finding embarrassment, nervous-
ness, and compulsive scratching, without physical injury, insufficient to support
claim); Hempel v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., Inc., 504 N.W.2d 487, 492
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring physical symptoms for recovery); Strauss v.
Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that general embar-
rassment, nervousness, and depression do not constitute sufficient physical in-
jury).
128. See, e.g., State Farm, 265 Minn. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41.
129. See Steenson, supra note 122, at 86; supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
130. See Steenson, supra note 122, at 86; supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
131. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983).
132. Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d
648, 652 n.3 (Minn. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d
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Furthermore, the resulting emotional distress must be "so severe that no
reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it."'33 To prove their
claims, Minnesota plaintiffs must show they suffered physical manifesta-
tions of the emotional distress that required psychological or medical
134
treatment.
Unlike negligent infliction of emotional distress, however, the success
of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim does not depend
on the establishment of another tort, such as defamation.3 5 A plaintiff's
failed defamation claim does not preclude recovery under the theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the plaintiff must
meet the rigid standards of pleading and proof that the supreme court has
mandated to limit recovery.
In Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme
Court instructed trial courts to limit recovery for emotional distress137
claims. In response, Minnesota courts consistently have denied recovery
as a matter of law for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
Such claims are generally denied because the conduct was not sufficiently
"extreme and outrageous" or because the emotional distress was not suffi-159
ciently severe.1 Therefore, an unsuccessful defamation plaintiff seems
(1965)).
133. Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 379 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439).
134. Compare Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (holding that the plaintiff's testimony
regarding depression, stomach disorders, skin rash, and high blood pressure, ab-
sent corroborating medical testimony, does not sustain a claim), and Strauss v.
Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating general embarrass-
ment, nervousness, and depression are not sufficient to sustain the claim), and
Born v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof, because they did not present
medical testimony to substantiate the alleged physical manifestations of their dis-
tress), with Venes v. Professional Serv. Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (stating that evidence of anger, migraines, ulcers, and spastic bowel
syndrome is sufficient to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim).
135. See Steenson, supra note 122, at 87.
136. See supra note 116.
137. 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn. 1983) (restating the need for trial courts
carefully to scrutinize evidence regarding the cause and the severity of the emo-
tional distress).
138. See, e.g., Conroy v. Kilzer, 789 E Supp. 1457, 1467 (D. Minn. 1992) (recog-
nizing that plaintiffs in Minnesota must clear high thresholds of severity and egre-
giousness before emotional distress claims may be submitted to a jury); see also
Steenson, supra note 122, at 36-37.
139. See, e.g., O'Brien v. A.B.E Midwest, Inc., 814 E Supp. 766, 777 (D. Minn.
1992) (holding that depression, headaches, loss of sleep, upset stomach, and yeast
infections do not manifest sufficiently severe distress and that intentional harass-
ment is not extreme and outrageous behavior); Conroy, 789 F. Supp. at 1467-68
(holding that statements accusing fire chief of aiding arsonists were not extreme
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unlikely to meet the stringent thresholds and the level of severity required
for recovery under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
Finally, a claim of invasion of privacy is a likely companion to a defa-
mation claim. The common-law right of privacy, which originated during140
the nineteenth century, has been separated into four distinct types of
invasion of privacy: (1) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (2)
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (3) public disclo-
sure of private facts; and (4) false light in the public eye. The purpose
of the invasion of privacy torts is to compensate for emotional distress re-
sulting from public ex osure 14 and to protect one's interest in peace of
mind and tranquillity.' Unsuccessful defamation plaintiffs in Minnesota,
however, may not obtain recovery for emotional distress under an invasion
of privacy theory.4
Despite widespread recognition of the invasion of privacy torts, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action for in-
vasion of privacy. 145 Furthermore, the court has failed to explain whether
and outrageous); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (stating that symptoms of depres-
sion, stomach disorders, skin rash, and high blood pressure are not severe enough
absent corroborating medical testimony); Strauss, 490 N.W.2d at 913 (holding that
general embarrassment, nervousness, and depression are not severe enough to
sustain a claim); Lund v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that posting of office memo - which resulted in harass-
ment and ridicule by co-workers and caused a co-worker to lace the plaintiff's cof-
fee with a pepper derivative - was not sufficiently outrageous conduct); Lee v. Met-
ropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that spreading damaging office gossip is not atrocious behavior); cf Venes, 353
N.W.2d at 673 (holding unfair debt collection practices, consisting of verbal abuse
and physical threats, was sufficiently egregious, and the resulting anger, migraine
headaches, ulcers, and aggravation of spastic bowel syndrome were sufficiently se-
vere manifestations of emotional distress).
140. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Har. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis criticized the press for overstep-
ping the "obvious bounds of propriety and decency." Id. at 196. They wrote:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civiliza-
tion, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual; but modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions
upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Id.
141. SeeKEETONETAL., supranote 1, § 117, at 851-66.
142. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1967).
143. See Walter D. Fisher, Jr., Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.: North
Carolina Rejects the False Light Invasion of Privacy Tort, 63 N.C. L. REV. 767, 773
(1985).
144. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 113. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False
19971
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it will consider the tort under more egregious circumstances. 146 Thus,
plaintiffs in Minnesota apparently cannot seek redress for emotional dis-
tress resulting from public exposure.
As a result of the supreme court's continuing skepticism toward emo-
tional distress claims and its failure to recognize invasion of privacy as an
actionable claim, many unsuccessful defamation plaintiffs will be deprived
of redress for their emotional injuries. Absent adoption of an invasion of
privacy tort or the relaxation of standards for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims, many emotional injuries will re-
main uncompensated under Minnesota law.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court radically altered common law
defamation claims in an attempt to balance First Amendment freedoms
and protection of reputational interests. The Supreme Court has de-
ferred to the states to decide for themselves whether emotional distress,
without proof of reputational harm, can sustain a defamation claim. The
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Richie to disallow such claims cor-
rectly interpreted the purpose of defamation law. Its decision, however,
creates a void that will leave many plaintiffs uncompensated for wrongful
emotional injury due to the court's consistently cautious attitude toward
emotional distress claims. Therefore, unless the court eases its standards
for emotional distress claims or adopts the invasion of privacy torts, many
plaintiffs will lack alternatives to recover for their emotional damages.
Tina L. Lorleberg
Light Invasion of Privacy - Cognizability and Elements, 57 A.L.R.4TH 22 (1987) (listing
jurisdictions that recognize some form of the invasion of privacy tort).
146. See Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996).
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